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1. The problern of reftrgees and displaoed persons fs an old one, but in
recent years - mainly as a result of political events in South Eaqt
Asia, Mghanistan lrra the' Hcrn of Africa - it ha,s reached unpar?lleled
proportions. At the start of the Ia.st decade, the numhr of reftrgees
and displaced persons amcunted, worldwide, to hundreds of thousand's i
novr, in 198I, they are numbered in millions. Ttre recent @neva conference
(feane) drew attention to the presence of 5 million such people in
Africa alone, and there are reported to be as many again in other
parts of the r,vorld.
Ttre huge increase in numbers that has occr:rred in the last thr) or three
years is reflected in the rrolunre of assistance [xovided by donors. The
Con'erm4ity, for example, gave 40 million dollars' rorth of aid to refi.rgees
and displaced perions in 1975 ; for:r years later this figrure hd risen
to 14O million dollars, Md at the Geneva conference, the Corurnrnity and
its Menirer States annor-mced contributions totalling sonre 17O million
dollars for 198I for Africa onIY.
TLre problern has not only grovrn 1n size, its real'character has al.so
changed in the past few yearb. Until cj:ite recently, when voluntary
repatriation was not trrcssible, it was generally felt that installation
in industrialized countries was the ansrryer. For the vast majority of,
today,s refi:qees, whether Kam6xrchean, Mghan or eirican, it is realised
that this solution is not feasible ; their nrral background' and, lack
of formal edrrcation and technical skills do not make them fit for such
a radical changre of envirorurcnt. Ttrey can.only either return to their
country of origin - whenever voluntary repatriation is feasible - or
settle in neighbor:ring host countries (most of wtrich are economically
fragile), or rernain permanently in .;* - ttris last .possibility being
'unaccetrrtable frorn a humanitarian point of viqr and, roreor.ner, politically
dangerous.
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The size and nature of the fefugee problem therefore rlean, .not only
tfrat maselve foreigrn atd ls,and will be needed eaeh tlne a new flow
of displrcdd.persons occurs, hrt also ttrat a larEe shatre" of assist-
ance qtro,rrld be dewted to lorrg-term solutionS, 1.e. helpirry ec6nqn-
ically rraat trost countri.es to settle their refuEee and dlspldced
poprlatlorrs elsewhere than in camps (as is belng done on a lirnlted
scale in ttrd Suaan), or helping cor:ntries of origin to settle their
returnees (as in Zimbab*e).
2. Over the past year or so, the growth of the reftrgee phenonrenon has
prompted close: analysis of it. At the'political leveI. there have
been several calls for preventive action : in May last year the -
E\ropean Council made 'ra vigorous appeal to ttre Goverrunents respons-
ible for it to remove the causes of ttris widespnead human tragedy" i
later the sane year, in 
.the U.N. General Asseribly, the Federal
&public of Germany ca1led for closer political cooperation to
elirninate the problem at its roots ; and nore recently, in Geneva,
delegations from Mrica, donor countries and from the Corrnission
echoed that same sentiment.
At the a&ninistrative level, there is a growilg realisation that
. 
refugee situations pass 
- 
or should pass 
- 
thror:gh different stages
requiring different forms of assistance. In the Conunission's analysis
- 
shared by other delegations at the Geneva conference 
- 
three tr*rases
are recogrnizable : a first, 
.erergelg{ phase innrediately after an in-
fltx of refi:gees, rvtren basic supplies (drugs, fo"d, shelter, clothing,
etc. ) are needed at once ; a second, subs.Ls'Eengg phase pending a
. 
durable soluti.on, when a certain degree of education, training and
local food prrodrrction are needed as rte1l as shelter, medical supplies
and dorestic utensils ; and a third, settlement phase when assi.stance
for the develotrment of both physical and social infrastnrcurre in
the.host country (or country of origin, in tirc case of \roluntary
repatriation is required, of benefit to tle locar as nerl as to
the refi.lgee poprlation.
i
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fnstitutionally and financially, the first tt+o phases pose less
problemo than the thlrd. UNfrcR has clear respons{bi}tty for emergarrcy
and sr:bsistence assistance to refugees, and other agencies (WFP,
LINfCEF, fCRC and a number of N@s) have denronstrated their ability
to implement energency and subsistence aid prografimes, r*rile all
major donors (includirrg the Corununity) can cover in cash or kind
the needs of refugees and displaced persons at-.these trro stages.
For the third phase however 
- 
settlement thror:gh "integtration" upon
return or in the host country 
- 
there is no one implementing agency
with clear responsiJcility, nor any special financial sutr4>ort from
donors. The first point was widely recognized at the Geneva Conference,
wtrere many delegations stressed the need for clarification of the
role of the different humanitarian and developnrent agrencies at the
settlement stage. Thd Conference indicated ttrat this guestion would
be discussed in detail within the United Nations family orrer the
coming nrcnths, and concluded that ITNHCR and other UN and voluntary
agencies should liaise closely with each other, and co-ordinate ttreir
policies and progrrafirrnes, so that "nredium and long term assistance
to refugees was not conceived on an ad hoc basis, nor assumed separat-
ely from on-going developnent progirarrnes."
the second point 
- inadequate funding for develotrment permitting
settlement 
- 
was in a sense illustrated by the financial outconte of
the Conference. Priority reqrrirements to be net in 1981-82 (enrergency
and sr-rbsistence progranmes) were estimated to cost 45O million dollars,
v*rile a rmreh larger ancunt was estimated to be necessarlz to.cover longer
term settlenent progrramnes. Ttre Gnference in fact raised 560 million
doIlars., so that at pnesent only 11O million dollars rrould be avail-
able for refugee integration, assurning 
- 
r*rich is most unlikely 
-
ttrat these funds will not be tied to new needS for enengrency and
subsistence aid.
I
I
VI.I'I./45o/81-El
-4-
3. ljlany Af,rican delegations to ths Gonfcrence ernphasized the rrery gbeat'
importance they attach, in view of their own inadequate resouree8,
to foreigfn aesistance for refi.lgtee integnation. Ttris is an area r,*fiere
ttre Conumlnity as srrch is not equipped.
In food ald and eilErgency aid (Article 137 of Lond fI, Article 95O
. of the Bnrdgetl, the Connnunity has the rneans to offer large-scale
assistance to reftrgrees and displaced persons durirg the emergorcy
and subsistence phases. It can only help.in a \rery rdest way during
tkre thi-rd phase, ehiefly by co-financing settlement projects
impilenented bry non{iovernmental organisations (Article 945 of the
Bur@et)
The @neva Conference made it clear that several African countries
now sheltering refr-qee pop:Iations have the political will to absorb
these refi.qiees and harre already made considerable sacrifices to help
ttrern" Ttreir or,m developxnent programnes have been slourcd dourt as a
result. It r.voul-d be dangerous to expect them to make further sacrifices
hy divertirg part of developnent aid destined for their own needy
populations to refi:gee settlement pnojects. The risk involved would be
that more and rnoreideveloping countries nould deny access to their
territories for new refuEees, and possibly try to eryel those wtp had
already arrived ; pressures by natiqnals wtpse lives and future
r.,ere directly affected by such a policy rrculd gain strerqth and thiq
. could lead 
- 
as alredy noted in sore area.s - to politically and
socially r.rnaceeptable corrditions and tensions ntrich could soon gtet out
of control. As far as the Corununity is corrcerned, it needs to be stressed
that the resotrrces of the European Develotrxent.I\rnd and of the br.ldget-
line for.non-associated deraelopirxg countries are intended for the
- developnent of the host countries ttrenrselves and their otfit populations,
and should not be used Exr a rreans of financirry durable solutions for
refugees.
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The Conmlsslon therefore consi.ders that, ln the absence of any
currenE suiEable form of Comnnrnity financlngr. the choice is
clear: either l,lembet States agree to creaEe a new Conrrnrntty
ald speclficalLy for this purposer'oE they agree to provlde
new frrirds themselves for thts third phase of the refirgee
problem, the task of the Connmrnlty betng ltmited to coordlnating,
tn line wlth the Geneva Conference concluslons, such bllateral
policles on refugee integraElon. The Coiirntsslon feeLs the
latter co,\rrse would be preferable, provlded the dentral
respgnsibtlity for coordination'at Conrnunlty level was clearly
deflned. '
The presenE conrrnrnlcation cal1s for a substantive discussion,
by Council and Parl"lament, of the.ideas and prlncl,ples ptrt
for*ard by the Conunlssion. In the light'of Ehes'e debates, the
Conrnlssion wtlI then make a formal proposal, posslbly before
the suwner of 1981.
